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The relationship between income inequality and the level of redistribution seems to be clear 
only at first glance. Despite the positive relation proposed by theory, empirical results remain 
ambiguous. The work project “Does Inequality Affect Redistribution? The Political Economy 
Aspect of the Redistribution Puzzle” seeks to investigate the channels that affect the 
relationship between inequality and redistribution. Using a TSCS data set on absolute 
redistribution in 64 countries starting in 1975, country fixed effects regressions yield that 
evidence for a positive relationship is weak. Furthermore, dependence on political-economy 
factors seems to be of importance and should be subject to further investigations.  
Income Inequality; Redistribution; Political Economy 
The Redistribution Puzzle  
A vast amount of academic literature, especially in the political economy context, builds on the 
idea formalized by Meltzer and Richard (1981), that more income inequality in a democracy 
leads to more redistribution1. Many recent theories on the influence inequality has on economic 
growth rely on this argument (e.g. see Tavares and Wacziarg 2001). Although some income 
inequality is essential for a market economy to work efficiently, and a natural consequence of 
market forces, too much inequality is thought to be destructive for social cohesion and hinder 
economic growth. One main argument runs through the distortionary effect redistribution is 
thought to have on economic decision making. It is thought to decrease incentives for labour 
and capital input and thus reduce economic growth. In this argument, it is taken as given that 
more inequality causes more redistribution. In fact, the relationship between these two variables 
is far from clear. Empirical studies often fail to observe any relationship between inequality and 
redistribution, or even find that more inequality is related to less redistribution. This has led to 
                                                
1 Although to be more precise, the M-R model relates redistribution to the mean-to-median income ratio which is 
only proxied by inequality. 
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the establishment of the ‘paradox of redistribution’ by some scholars (e.g. see Sánchez and 
Goda 2017). 
To obtain a first insight into the relationship, Graph 1 plots the absolute redistribution (which 
is the difference in the Gini coefficient between market and disposable income) against the 
market Gini coefficient over a period from 1975 to 20162. Nine representative countries are 
selected, as plotting all 176 countries for which data on these variables in available is beyond 
the scope of the thesis. Selection covers emerging and developed markets, illustrating the 
variety in redistribution in countries within a similar state of development.  
Graph 1: Market Gini and Redistribution in Selected Countries 
Of particular note is the fact that both the market Gini and redistribution exhibit wide variance 
in the given group of countries. First, it can be seen that market income inequality has been 
rising in most countries over the last decades, most notably in China3. Although, Argentina and 
Brazil experienced a decline in income inequality most recently. It is noted, that redistribution 
                                                
2 Data for Graph 1 is taken from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database by Solt.  
3 Although only democratic countries should be considered to examine the relationship as voting is a central 




is much higher with respect to the market Gini in the more developed countries. Moreover, the 
variables move in parallel in some countries, while patterns demerge in others (most notably 
the least developed). Overall, the graph suggests the lack of a systematic relation between 
income inequality and redistribution. This first graphical insight supports the idea that 
redistribution is not solely dependent on the level of income inequality, but that other factors 
interfere and should be considered when investigating the relationship. Hence, the question 
remains whether countries with higher income inequality redistribute more, as suggested by 
theory. There is reason to believe that political economy factors intervene in the relationship by 
affecting the extent to which existing preferences over redistribution are formed into policy 
decisions and thus outcomes.  
This thesis seeks to investigate on a cross-national level the political economy channels through 
which inequality affects redistribution to shed light on the inconclusive empirical results. By 
employing a panel fixed effects model the following research question is sought to be answered: 
Does more income inequality lead to more redistribution? Hence the thesis adds to the existing 
literature by extending the analysis to more recent data, which allows to use a direct measure 
of redistribution. Furthermore, focus is laid on the political economy mechanisms, taking the 
interaction with these contextual factors into account. The thesis is structured as follows: first, 
an overview on the current state of research is provided and a theoretical discussion of the 
political economy channels between inequality and redistribution presented in a reasonably 
exhaustive way. Then focus is laid in detail on the methodology to assess the relationship and 
the data used is introduced. The empirical results are then presented and discussed. 
The Complex and Dynamic Relationship Between Inequality and Redistribution  
Market income inequality has increased in the advanced economies in recent years and reached 
its highest level in decades, while the pattern is more mixed in emerging markets and 
developing economies. It is commonly assumed that more unequal societies tend to push for 
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more redistribution, which is relevant as recent academic discussions are concerned with the 
effect redistribution has on economic growth. The dependence of this relationship on political 
economy factors, though, has not been elaborated much in the academic literature. While the 
basic mechanism works through the median voter hypothesis, other factors on which the 
relationship might depend have not been explored thoroughly. Attempting to close this gap in 
academic research, this thesis focuses solely on the macro level, abstracting from individual 
behaviour, and tries to identify factors influencing the relationship between inequality and 
redistribution. 
Inconclusive Results 
In the context of the well-known political economy model of redistribution by Meltzer and 
Richard (1981)4, more inequality should lead to more redistribution, which is rather intuitive. 
In a simplified voter model the median income voter is decisive in the political process. Thus, 
assuming a typically right-skewed distribution of incomes, the median voter supports 
redistributive spending up to the point when the benefit is outweighed by costs of distortionary 
taxes. The more unequal a society, the lower the median voter’s income is relative to the mean 
income. Given progressive taxes, the median voter gains from redistribution, and the more so, 
the more unequal the income distribution. This model might be too simple though, to describe 
the more complex reality, as it assumes that the median voter’s single-peaked preferences are 
taken into consideration in a majority voting environment where almost all individuals can 
participate. The lack of strong empirical evidence of the positive relationship between income 
inequality and redistribution has motivated the development of alternative theories on the macro 
and micro level. Several recent studies conclude, contrary to the M-R model argumentation, 
that market income inequality is not an important determinant of the level of redistribution (see 
Houle 2017 for an extensive overview of the literature and contrasting results). Besides noting 
                                                
4 Henceforth referred to as the M-R model. 
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the flaws stemming from the simplifying nature of the assumptions made, they argue that 
institutional factors, the distribution of power resources, the targeting of redistribution 
instruments as well as the insurance character of social policies are more relevant to explain 
empirical patterns (see Moene and Wallerstein 2001, Borck 2005, Iversen and Soskice 2006, 
Kenworthy and McCall 2008). Pecoraro (2017) introduces the time component into the classical 
micro-model and argues that preferences of individuals not only depend on income but also 
wealth. He shows that an increase in inequality can be accompanied by either an increase or 
decrease in redistribution, objecting the systematic relationship proposed by the M-R model. 
Focus is also laid more frequently on the inclusion of alternative explanatory and intervening 
factors such as corruption and ethnic fractionalization to explain the mixed results obtained in 
previous studies (Houle 2017, Sanchez and Goda 2017).  
The Political Economy of Inequality and Redistribution   
Inconclusive empirical results of the M-R model led to the development of a range of alterative 
theories. One line of arguments that received less attention in the academic literature so far is 
the dependence of the relationship on factors concerning the political economy context. As 
redistribution occurs on a central level, the impact of inequality in redistribution depends on 
factors that intervene at several stages of the political process. The effect of such contextual 
factors on redistributive spending has found great interest in the literature on comparative 
welfare states, but has not been regarded in the context of inequality and redistribution. In the 
following, the factors thought to intervene in the process and examined empirically in the next 
section, are organised into two categories, societal and institutional factors.  
Societal factors  
To begin with, individuals need to be able to express well informed preferences over the level 
of redistribution for which they need some minimum level of education. One can imagine that 
citizens that are poorly informed about the prevailing income distribution, have difficulty 
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assessing their political preferences over redistribution. Additionally, the level of human capital 
correlates with individual labour productivity, which has implications for the distribution of 
market income. Higher human capital signals less dependence on government protection and 
thus lower aggregate demand for redistribution (Dallinger 2010: 339). In addition, after citizens 
form their preferences, they need to be able to channel them through the political process 
without distortion. In particular, for their actual preferences to be channelled, political 
corruption should not disturb the transmission or change the preferences. Across a set of 
developed and developing countries, Sánchez and Goda (2017) show that higher levels of 
corruption are related to lower levels of redistribution. Among the mechanisms explaining the 
finding are vote-buying, a lower trust in institutions, and the costs of corruption and lobbying. 
Lobbying might result in public resources being allocated in a way that is not truly 
redistributional, but benefits the lobbying groups. The more profitable sectors and wealthy 
interest groups often find it easier to gather resources to lobby in their interest5.  
Institutional factors  
The second category constitute institutional factors. Most relevant for the assumed relationship 
is the transfer of preferences into political action. In the political process itself, a main factor is 
the institutional setting of a country. As noted by Milanovic (2000), one assumption of the M-
R model is that (almost) all individuals vote, which implies that the inequality-redistribution 
relationship is expected to be more pronounced in democracies. At the same time, the civil 
liberties prevailing in a country are indicative of the possibilities citizens have to express their 
preferences, not only through elections, but through other forms of political action such as 
demonstrations. Additionally, the status of political rights and the setting under which political 
competition occurs also indicate how far the political process itself is following institutional 
                                                
5 Esteban and Ray (2006) capture the idea that both economically profitable sectors and those dominated by 
wealthy interest groups have more of an incentive to lobby and find it easier to do so. 
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guidelines and how closely electoral promises morph into policy. Likewise, the status of the 
rule of law in a country captures the degree to which citizens can have confidence in institutions 
and in the enforcement of the existing law.  
Macroeconomic control factors 
From the macroeconomic side, the economic situation of a country should play a role in the 
demand for redistribution, though the expected direction is not clear. On the one hand, people 
experiencing a prosperous period can have a higher tolerance for more redistribution. On the 
other hand, they might experience a decreasing need for government protection, or more 
vulnerability to progressive taxation, and thus reject redistribution (Dallinger 2010). 
Meanwhile, globalization is thought to be one of the main determinants of rising income 
inequality and expected to also influence redistribution by introducing global competition for 
resources and thus constraints for countries.  
Empirical Assessment of the Relationship  
Definition of the Main Concepts  
To begin with, the concepts being analysed need to be defined. Preferences for redistribution 
are considered to be based on market inequality, as in Milanovic 2000, which is thus the main 
independent variable of interest. Following the M-R model, the Gini coefficient of market 
income is the appropriate measure of inequality for this purpose as it is a widely used concept, 
comparable across time and countries. It is a measure of inequality of income pre-taxes and pre-
transfers. As the Gini coefficient is an aggregate statistic, it might conceal underlying 
differences between countries. Despite this shortcoming, other measures of inequality such as 
income share ratios, are less frequently available and are not useful as sample size is restricted.  
The dependent variable redistribution is the reduction (or increase) in the Gini coefficient due 
to redistributive measures such as taxes and transfers in a specific country, over a year. Absolute 
redistribution is defined as the difference between the Gini coefficient of market income and of 
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disposable income (that is post-taxes and transfers). Relative redistribution is defined as the 
difference between market and disposable Gini as share of market Gini6. Higher values on both 
variables indicate more redistribution. The decision to focus on absolute redistribution in this 
thesis comes from the observation that relative redistribution also depends on the initial level 
of inequality in a country. Given the same reduction in inequality, a country having a higher 
initial inequality will exhibit a higher relative redistribution score. To avoid a distortion of the 
total reduction in inequality achieved through the political process, absolute redistribution is 
used in the main analysis, but relative redistribution is used to check for robustness (see Annex 
III). These two redistribution measures are the appropriate concepts to evaluate redistribution 
in the context of the M-R model, although they ignore second order effects7. An aspect that 
might be responsible for a lack of inconclusive evidence in previous studies is the usage of an 
inadequate definition of redistribution due to the problem that market inequality data has been 
rarely available. Researchers thus heavily relied on proxies such as social spending or marginal 
tax rates which do not quite cover the concept of an absolute change in inequality due to 
redistribution, as defined in the context of the M-R model.  
Data and Variables 
The impact of inequality and the contextual factors on redistribution discussed above, is to be 
tested empirically. For this purpose, the appropriate variables need to be defined and gathered 
first. The Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) by Solt is consulted for 
data on the Gini coefficients of market and disposable income inequality, as well as the absolute 
and relative redistribution measures. The SWIID uses several data sources and employs a 
missing-data multiple imputations algorithm to provide a dataset on the standard baseline of the 
                                                
6 The following equations are used to compute absolute and relative redistribution respectively: 
𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒	𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛/,1 = 	𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖	𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡/,1	– 	𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒	𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖	/,1 




7 Secord order effects are the effects redistributive measures, such as taxes and transfers, have on the distribution 
of market income itself. Taxes and transfers may for example change individual decisions on education, 
employment or investments which in turn affect aggregate market income. 
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Luxembourg Income Study (see Solt 2016 for details). It provides comparable Gini indices of 
market and disposable income for 174 countries and over the widest possible range of years, 
starting in 1960. It thus partially overcomes the problem on data availability and comparability 
faced by previous studies on the matter, especially regarding market Gini. Single measures of 
the market as well as disposable Gini and absolute and relative redistribution, as well as their 
respective standard errors, are provided. For summary statistics of variables refer to the table 
in Appendix I.  
Table 1 gives an overview of the variables used in the analysis and refers to their source8. 
Measures of GDP per capita introduce an estimation of the economic situation. The income 
share held by the top 10 percent is used as a proxy of the de facto power lying in the hand of 
the top income class and accounts for the degree of lobbying possibly coming from the top 
income group. The human capital index is based on the average years of schooling and an 
assumed rate of return to education and should thus cover the concept of the economic value of 
human capital. A shortcoming of this measure is that it does not account for actual cognitive 
ability and, as all aggregate measures, conceals the underlying distribution. To account for the 
ability of citizens to express their preferences in the political context, measures of the regulation 
and competitiveness of participation are included. They both describe the extent to which the 
political environment and institutions allow for political influence of certain groups in society. 
From the Polity IV score a dichotomous measure of democracy is constructed, using the 
authors’ classification of a country as a democracy when it reaches a score of 6 or higher. 
Indices of political rights and civil liberties are thought to express the degree to which citizens 
can act within a free and fair political environment and express their preferences through 
various channels9. Furthermore, a measure of political corruption is thought to proxy how far 
                                                
8 The variables mapping the contextual factors are merged using ISO3C country codes, which are assigned to the 
SWIID data in a first step. 
9 As the format, available on the Freedom House website, is very inconvenient to use in STATA, a long-format 
published by Amanda B. Edgell is used (https://acrowinghen.com/data/).  
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the transmission of preferences through the political process is distorted10. The focus of this 
analysis is set on the country level relationship and individual level factors are thus left aside. 
Although these are highly relevant to explain the relationship between inequality and 
redistribution, their analysis should be viewed as complementary11. 
Table 1: Description of the Variables used in the Analysis  
Variable Description Source 
Absolute Redistribution 
0 to 100, Gini points, higher 






0 to 100, percentage points, 
higher values indicate more 
inequality 
Market Gini 0 to 100, higher values indicate more inequality 
Disposable Gini 0 to 100, higher values indicate more inequality 
GDP per capita In constant 2010 USD 
World Bank Top 10 Income share of top 10% 
Rule of Law -2.5 to 2.5, higher values indicate better rule of law 
Human Capital Higher values indicate higher aggregate human capital Penn World Tables 
Political Rights 1 to 7, higher values indicate more freedom Freedom House 
Civil Liberties 1 to 7, higher values indicate more freedom 
Democracy -10 to 10, higher values indicate more democratic 
Polity IV Regulation of Participation 0 to 5, higher values indicate more regulation 
Competitiveness of Participation 1 to5, higher values indicate more competitiveness 
Political Corruption 0 to 1, higher values indicate more corruption Varieties of Democracy 
Final Dataset and Methodology  
The final dataset comprises data on redistribution for 64 mostly advanced and emerging 
economies over the period from 1960 to 2016, including 57 democracies. Values are not 
available for all country years so the sample is unbalanced which is not a problem to the cross-
                                                
10 Data is taken from the Quality of Government dataset published by the University of Gothenburg.  




sectional analysis. Large differences in the average redistribution can be seen across countries: 
while Costa Rica has an absolute redistribution of -1.3 Gini points on average, indicating that 
disposable income inequality is even increased after taxes and transfers, Hungary reduces the 
Gini by 27 points on average. A similar picture emerges for the variety in Gini coefficients of 
market income, where Namibia displays the highest Gini on average across years with 66, and 
Ukraine the lowest with around 27.  
To assess how far the aforementioned factors affect the relationship between market income 
inequality and redistribution, a fixed effects regression is conducted. The simplest 
representation of the model is the following, where 𝜀/1 is the idiosyncratic error term which 
does not correlate with the regressor and is i.i.d., while 𝛼/ captures the individual characteristics. 
The fixed effects model implies autocorrelation of the error term 𝑢/1 as the individual 
characteristics are correlated over time within a country.  
𝑦/1 = 𝛽N + 𝛽P𝑥/1 + 𝑢/1, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	𝑢/1 = 	𝛼/ + 𝜀/1 (1) 
As the focus of attention is on the contextual factors across countries, fixed effects are used to 
hold constant the individual characteristics of each country. Mostly time-invariant 
characteristics, such as fundamental views countries have over the desirability of equality and 
redistributive policies or historical differences, are captured by the fixed effects model. The 
estimated coefficients can thus not be biased by possibly omitted time-invariant variables. By 
demeaning the variables, the fixed effects model eliminates all between-country variability and 
leaves the within-country variability for analysis. As the fixed effects regression model refers 
to the OLS estimator under the classical assumptions regarding the error term, the non-violation 
of the assumptions needs to be tested. A Hausman specification test is run to formally check 
whether fixed effects are more appropriate given the data. Given the result of the test on a basic 
regression, the null hypothesis that the unique errors are not correlated with the regressors is 
rejected. Using fixed effects is thus appropriate in this case. The disadvantage of using fixed 
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effects is that variables that do not exhibit within variation, such as ethnic fractionalization, 
cannot be used in the analysis. Running a modified Wald-test for group-wise heteroscedasticity 
yields that the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected. Furthermore, a Wooldridge test 
for autocorrelation reveals that there is serial correlation. Hence, the cluster option is used 
estimate standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.  
As the interest is not only how the contextual factors affect redistribution but more 
precisely how the contextual factors impact the relationship between inequality and 
redistribution, interaction effects are introduced. Adding an interaction term allows for the 
analysis of different relationships between inequality and redistribution, depending on the 
contextual factor. It is thus possible to determine whether the relationship is different when a 
country is subject to a specific institutional setting or societal characteristics. Following the 
categorization of variables in the theoretical part, first the societal and then the institutional 
factors will be analysed empirically separately. The economic wellbeing (proxied by GDP per 
capita) is included in all model specifications as control. In the following, the results of the 
fixed effects regressions are elaborated in detail. Estimations are restricted to democratic 
countries per logic of the M-R model.  
Results of the Regression Analysis 
To begin with, a simple regression of redistribution on the one period lag of market Gini is 
performed (Model (1) in Table 2) to estimate the direct effect without controlling for other 
factors. It cannot be expected that redistribution occurs immediately when citizens push for it 
as any policy needs some time to come to fruition. Hence, a one period lag is thought to be 
appropriate to account for the time lag in implementation. For the interaction effects the 
contemporaneous inequality level is used. In a given country, an increase of one point in the 
market Gini is associated with an increase of 0.386 units of redistribution one period later, 
which is significant at the 0.1 percent level. This is equal to saying that for a one Gini point 
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increase in market inequality, the difference between market and disposable Gini decreases by 
around 0.4 points in the next period. Only assessing the impact of inequality on redistribution 
yields an R-square of 0.46, so almost half of the variation on redistribution is explained by the 
lag of inequality prevailing in a country. In Model (2), the societal contextual factors human 
capital (HC), share of income accruing to the top 10 percent, and a measure of political 
corruption are included while the results are controlled for the level of GDP. The coefficient of 
market Gini stays highly significant and around 0.3, indicating a positive relationship even after 
controlling for a more extensive set of variables. Furthermore, the share of income held by the 
top 10 percent seems to slightly reduce redistribution, as expected, while human capital has a 
strong positive impact. Both variables are significant at conventional levels.  
Lastly, interaction effects between the market Gini and the three societal factors are 
introduced in Model (3) to (5) to examine how the impact inequality has on redistribution 
depends on the contextual factors. As variables are all continuous, the effects are difficult to 
interpret directly. It is first of all apparent, that only human capital and political corruption as 
well as their respective interaction with the market Gini remain highly significant when 
including all factors (Model (5)). Evaluating the overall effect, the level of inequality has on 
redistribution requires assessing the effects at different values of human capital, political 
corruption, and top income decile share. For this, partial derivatives with respect to inequality 
can be computed. Holding all else constant, an increase in inequality in a specific country would 
thus have a more positive effect on redistribution for higher levels of human capital, despite the 
large negative direct effect of human capital on redistribution. This positive dependence of the 
relationship between inequality and redistribution on the level of human capital supports the 
hypothesis that better educated societies manage to transform their preferences for 
redistribution better into policy outcomes. At the same time does higher human capital itself 
seem to be related to lower redistribution levels. Likewise, an increase in inequality leads to 
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less redistribution in a politically more corrupt country. This is in line with the theoretical 
argument that corruption distorts the transmission of redistributive preferences through the 
political process.  
Table 2 - Societal Factors 
Absolute Redistribution (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lag Gini Market 0.386*** 0.318*** -0.111 -0.081 -0.012 
 (0.049) (0.068) (0.075) (0.074) (0.073) 
GDP  -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HC  1.250* -7.604*** -7.719*** -7.713*** 
  (0.531) (1.560) (1.773) (1.595) 
Top10  -0.191*** -0.221*** -0.164 -0.229 
  (0.038) (0.036) (0.156) (0.119) 
Pol. Corruption  1.076 2.836** 2.981** 17.142** 
  (1.176) (1.034) (0.930) (4.964) 
Gini*HC   0.175*** 0.176*** 0.166*** 
   (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) 
Gini*Top 10    -0.001 0.001 
    (0.003) (0.002) 
Gini*Pol. Corr.     -0.287* 
     (0.110) 
R2 0.46 0.38 0.53 0.53 0.56 
N 1,647 604 604 604 604 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
The last model, including all societal factors, exhibits a within R-square of 0.56, indicating that 
slightly more than half of the within variation in the dependent variable is explained by the 
included variables. Including the societal factors reduces the number of observations from more 
than 1600 to 604, but more than 50 democracies remain for analysis thus still offering a wide 
sample to ensure generality of results.  
Table 3 shows the results for including the institutional context factors. Most apparent is that 
the coefficient for the market Gini turns negative and is highly significant when controlling for 
the institutional factors and the interaction effects of regulation and competitiveness of 
participation in Model (7) and the interactions with political rights and civil liberties in Model 
(8). In contrast, only including the institutional context factors (Model (6)) and the interaction 
with the rule of law (Model (9)) yields a positive and statistically significant coefficient of 
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inequality. While the direct effect of the regulation of participation is large and negative, the 
interaction effect is rather small but positive. Competitiveness of participation, and the 
interaction with inequality, remains an insignificant factor in all specifications. Taking the 
partial derivative of the equation of Model (7) with respect to inequality yields that 
redistribution in the next period decreases by 0.29 points for a one unit increase in inequality. 
In addition, redistribution increases in inequality given a higher level of regulation of 
participation. The last finding is in line with the hypothesized interaction between inequality 
and the institutional context. Given a better regulation of participation, citizens should have 
more opportunity to voice their preferences and engage in policy formation.  
In a next specification (Model (8)), the interactions of inequality with political rights 
and civil liberties are accounted for. As before, the coefficient of inequality is negative at 0.236 
and significant at a 5 percent level of confidence. The coefficient of political rights is negative 
and relatively large at a 1 percent level of significance, while the interaction between political 
rights and inequality is small but positive and significant at a 5 percent level. The theoretically 
expected relationship is supported by these results. As better political rights prevail in a country, 
demands for redistribution can better be translated into policies. Civil liberties remain an 
insignificant regressor in the model. Model (9) tests the dependence of the inequality-
redistribution relationship on the interaction of inequality with the rule of law. While in this 
case the direct effect of inequality in a country on next period’s redistribution is positive, the 
direct effect of rule of law is large and negative. A one unit increase in the index of rule of law 
reduces redistribution by more than 13 Gini points. Again, the interaction effect is substantially 
smaller and significantly positive.  
Lastly, a model including only the significant of the afore listed institutional contextual factors 
is employed (Model (10)). The impact of inequality on redistribution turns out to be negative, 
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as in some of the models before, and only the factors regulation of participation and rule of law 
remain significant at conventional levels.  
Table 3 - Institutional Factors 
Absolute Redistribution (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Lag Gini Market 0.257** -0.290*** -0.236* 0.207*** -0.151* 
 (0.076) (0.074) (0.100) (0.052) (0.068) 
GDP 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Regulation of Part. -0.178 -7.951*** -0.112 -0.058 -5.796** 
 (0.140) (1.666) (0.123) (0.165) (1.808) 
Competitiveness of Part. 0.231 -0.019 0.112 0.123  
 (0.224) (1.161) (0.179) (0.195)  
Political Rights -0.238 -0.197 -3.083** -0.173 0.010 
 (0.174) (0.107) (1.106) (0.148) (0.478) 
Civil Liberties 0.055 0.057 -1.057 0.131  
 (0.201) (0.161) (1.394) (0.171)  
Rule of Law -1.008 -0.418 -1.003 -13.774*** -6.938** 
 (0.548) (0.358) (0.535) (1.692) (2.091) 
Gini*Reg. of Part.  0.167***   0.122** 
  (0.035)   (0.038) 
Gini*Compet. of Part.  -0.002    
  (0.025)    
Gini*Pol. Rights   0.058*  -0.003 
   (0.022)  (0.009) 
Gini*Civil Liberties   0.026   
   (0.028)   
Gini*Rule of Law    0.275*** 0.137** 
    (0.035) (0.047) 
R2 0.29 0.56 0.39 0.51 0.59 
N 882 882 882 882 882 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
Including different combinations of interaction effects drastically impacts not only the sign of 
the direct impact of inequality on redistribution, but also the significance and size of the 
institutional factors. While the respective institutional factors are only significant conditional 
on including the interaction, none is significant without any interactions (Model (6)). Including 
only the institutional factors yields an R-square value of only 0.29, including interactions 
largely improves this value up to 0.59 in Model (10). The fact that the sign of the estimated 
impact inequality has on redistribution depends on the inclusion of the interactions with the 
institutional factors, is suggestive of the non-mechanical relationship underlying. Contextual 
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factors seem to conceal the negative impact rising inequality has on redistribution, which in 
unveiled when controlling for these factors. 
To check for the robustness of results, time fixed effects, in form of year-dummies, are included 
(see Appendix II). Although the R-square values improve slightly compared to results in Table 
2 and Table 3, coefficients of the independent variables do not change in sign and only vary 
slightly in strength. It is thus concluded, that country specific effects only differ moderately 
over time and are well captured by the country fixed effects used in the main regressions. In a 
last step, the regressions are run controlling for the lag of the dependent variable as it can be 
assumed that redistribution is relatively sticky over time (see Appendix III). Non-surprisingly, 
results yield that the coefficient for the lag of redistribution is well above 0.9 and highly 
significant while the R-square is close to 1. Moreover, coefficients of the effect of market 
inequality on redistribution shrink in size. More interesting is the fact, that all significant 
coefficients for the estimated impact of inequality are negative when controlling for the 
previous period’s redistribution. In Model (30), controlling for the previous redistribution level 
as well as the societal factors and their interactions, a one unit increase in inequality results in 
a direct decrease of redistribution of 0.163 points. Including interactions with the significant 
institutional factors, yields that the effect of inequality on redistribution is negative and highly 
significant at a magnitude of around 0.175 (Model (35)).  
This indicates that the doubts on the M-R model expressed by previous findings are justified. 
Controlling for previous redistribution supports empirical evidence that the effect of inequality 
of redistribution is actually negative, contrary to the M-R model and supporting the 
‘redistribution paradox’. Hence, despite the theoretical arguments for a positive effect 
increasing inequality in a country should have on future redistribution, empirical evidence 
shows otherwise. Moreover, does the inclusion of the lag of redistribution show that almost all 
of the variation within redistribution is explained by its previous level. The aspect of time-
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dependence thus complicates the evaluation of the relationship. Running the same regressions 
on relative redistribution as the dependent variable yields similar results, although the R-square 
values of the models are very low so the specifications do not seem to explain much of the 
variation of the relative redistribution (see Annex III).  
Discussion and Final Remarks  
Widening economic disparity is one of the main challenges of our time and its implications are 
at the core of the policy debate today. One main question is whether and how governments are 
able to mediate some of the inequality which stems from global market forces. A puzzle which 
arose concerns the fact whether countries experiencing more income inequality actually put 
more effort into redistributing. As traditional economic theory suggests, making use of the 
median voter theorem, more inequality should lead to increased redistribution. From the results 
of the fixed effects panel regression it can be concluded that the positive relationship is more 
than dubious. Rather, it can be expected that the relationship is negative under many 
circumstances. Furthermore, the relationship seems to depend on certain contextual political 
economy factors which might explain different patterns across countries. Evaluating societal 
factors, rising inequality seems to have a more positive effect on redistribution in countries that 
have a higher human capital and less political corruption. On the institutional side, results yield 
that an increase in inequality results in more redistribution when countries have a better 
regulation of participation and a better rule of law.  
These results are confirmed when combining the societal and institutional factors within one 
regression model. Although the number of observations drops to 496 including all factors, still 
52 countries with up to 16 years of observations are included. Table 4 presents the results 
controlling for the full set of factors. Most apparent is that when controlling for only the political 
economy factors, without accounting for interaction effects, a one point increase in the lag of 
market Gini is estimated to result in an increase in redistribution by 0.32 points. When including 
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all interaction effects with inequality (Model (14)), the coefficient of inequality turns negative 
and is highly significant at 0.165, which resembles results obtained in the previous separate 
analysis. Moreover, the human capital, regulation of participation, civil liberties and the rule of 
law remain significant interaction effects with inequality. The effect inequality has on 
redistribution depends on the characteristics a country has, regarding these factors.  
Table 4 - Institutional Factors 
Absolute Redistribution (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Lag Gini Market 0.320*** -0.074 -0.042 -0.165** -0.106 
 (0.052) (0.050) (0.053) (0.054) (0.055) 
GDP -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HC 3.150*** -7.542*** 1.568** -4.915* -5.769* 
 (0.528) (1.808) (0.516) (2.164) (2.174) 
Top10 -0.192*** -0.283* -0.153*** -0.201* -0.184*** 
 (0.034) (0.130) (0.028) (0.092) (0.027) 
Pol. Corruption 0.800 17.512** 1.516 -1.180  
 (1.291) (5.780) (1.073) (5.903)  
Regulation of Part. -0.153* -0.078 -2.758** -2.943** -3.086*** 
 (0.068) (0.105) (0.988) (0.861) (0.850) 
Competitiveness of Part. 0.057 -0.035 -1.336 0.686  
 (0.138) (0.167) (0.939) (0.936)  
Political Rights 0.079 0.064 -0.378 -1.070  
 (0.103) (0.084) (0.716) (0.680)  
Civil Liberties -0.302** -0.115 0.014 1.386** 1.014* 
 (0.107) (0.141) (0.421) (0.452) (0.450) 
Rule of Law -0.241 -0.415 -5.119*** -6.008*** -4.849*** 
 (0.347) (0.278) (1.433) (1.636) (1.344) 
Gini*HC  0.182***  0.125** 0.136** 
  (0.033)  (0.038) (0.041) 
Gini*Top 10  0.001  0.001  
  (0.002)  (0.002)  
Gini*Pol. Corr.  -0.322**  0.065  
  (0.117)  (0.119)  
Gini*Reg. of Part.   0.056** 0.061** 0.063*** 
   (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) 
Gini*Compet. of Part.   0.028 -0.016  
   (0.021) (0.020)  
Gini*Pol. Rights   0.008 0.022  
   (0.015) (0.014)  
Gini*Civil Liberties   -0.003 -0.031** -0.025* 
   (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Gini*Rule of Law   0.105** 0.120** 0.093** 
   (0.031) (0.034) (0.029) 
R2 0.51 0.65 0.71 0.74 0.74 
N 496 496 496 496 531 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
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The main conclusion from this is that the total effect an increase in inequality has on 
redistribution seems to be mediated through political economy factors and that controlling for 
the context unveils the negative relationship. The findings made in the separate analyses of the 
factors are confirmed in the joint analysis. The R-square of the full model is 0.74 indicating that 
the included factors explain much of the variation in redistribution.  
Several problems with the analysis remain: First, it is unclear within which time frame the 
inequality people experience should have an impact on redistribution. Second, 
interdependencies between inequality and the other factors are likely to be present, which is 
difficult to control for. The inclusion of the previous level of redistribution discloses the main 
challenges when evaluation the relationship. As there is no natural starting point in the process, 
the interplay of the variables is difficult to uncover. The stickiness of redistribution over time 
is natural to any policy of this kind. Extensive modifications to redistributive policies only 
phase in gradually and are unusual without major political disruptions. But as previous 
redistribution impacts today’s inequality, the endogeneity of the variables cannot be fully 
addressed by the model specifications.  
A drawback of the diverse sample used it that variables are difficult to measure consistently 
across time and countries. Especially the inclusion of emerging economies introduced 
measurement errors, data unavailability and generally higher uncertainty in data. Hence, more 
carefully collected data in the future is needed to improve the analysis. As noted above, micro 
and macro level analysis of the relationship are needed to generate a holistic picture. Especially 
the underlying understanding of equality within a society should explain much of the variation 
and is thus to be considered more closely. Overall, the conducted macro analysis of contextual 
factors adds to the existing literature by expanding the investigation to the setting within which 
the process takes place. The Meltzer-Richard model works well theoretically, and the 
relationship between the level of income inequality and redistribution seems to be explained 
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well by the mechanism working through the median voter theorem. But as empirical results 
point into an opposite direction, it cannot be ruled out that the decision makers are actually less 
responsive to inequality levels. To investigate the relationship further, the political process 
should be reviewed more in-depth, e.g. focusing on the electoral process.  
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Appendix 
I. Summary Statistics 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Absolute 
Redistribution 
overall 10.50278 7.69368 -1.8 31.6 N 2014 
between  7.65809 -1.3 27.1 n 64 
within  1.32607 4.0 15.9 T-bar 31.46880 
Gini_mkt 
overall 45.32427 6.75716 21.2 68.5 N 4874 
between  6.28712 26.7 65.9 n 179 
within  2.44593 34.8 55.6 T-bar 27.22910 
GDP 
overall 11943.29000 16616.55000 182.7 111968.4 N 4634 
between  14962.97000 238.0 85470.9 n 173 
within  4966.40900 -25658.2 44501.7 T-bar 26.78610 
Open 
overall 75.34261 49.86886 0.2 441.6 N 4515 
between  44.78135 19.0 348.5 n 171 
within  17.67027 -27.3 210.1 T-bar 26.40350 
HC 
overall 2.31819 0.70131 1.0 3.7 N 4250 
between  0.65563 1.1 3.5 n 139 
within  0.25535 1.4 3.5 T-bar 30.57550 
Top10 
overall 31.16566 7.61835 17.1 61.5 N 1264 
between  6.70726 21.0 53.3 n 156 
within  2.58947 16.4 48.7 T-bar 8.10256 
PolCorr. 
overall 0.46513 0.28287 0.0 0.9 N 4383 
between  0.26888 0.0 0.9 n 157 
within  0.07754 -0.1 0.8 T-bar 27.91720 
Par_Reg 
overall 3.50484 1.22404 1.0 5.0 N 4239 
between  1.02815 1.0 5.0 n 147 
within  0.60799 0.7 5.7 T-bar 28.83670 
Par_Comp 
overall 1.62912 12.36715 -88.0 5.0 N 4279 
between  11.94707 -77.0 5.0 n 149 
within  10.21705 -89.2 41.1 T-bar 28.71810 
Pol_Rights 
overall 4.80698 2.04608 1.0 7.0 N 4440 
between  1.93314 1.0 7.0 n 172 
within  0.94184 -0.2 9.0 T-bar 25.81400 
Civil_lib 
overall 4.75135 1.74207 1.0 7.0 N 4440 
between  1.66091 1.0 7.0 n 172 
within  0.73982 0.3 7.4 T-bar 25.81400 
RoL2 overall 0.02012 1.00397 -2.0 2.1 N 2362 
 
between  0.98700 -1.9 2.0 n 175 





II. Including time fixed effects 
Table 5 - Societal Factors including time fixed effects (year dummies not displayed) 
Absolute Redistribution (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Lag Gini Market 0.292*** 0.302*** -0.139* -0.079 -0.004 
 (0.054) (0.060) (0.067) (0.061) (0.061) 
GDP  -0.000 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HC  1.256 -9.444*** -9.899*** -9.937*** 
  (1.124) (1.876) (2.167) (1.927) 
Top10  -0.162*** -0.188*** -0.060 -0.123 
  (0.035) (0.033) (0.143) (0.107) 
Pol. Corruption  0.984 2.602** 2.916** 17.729*** 
  (0.902) (0.849) (0.864) (4.728) 
Gini*HC   0.177*** 0.179*** 0.170*** 
   (0.033) (0.036) (0.034) 
Gini*Top 10    -0.002 -0.001 
    (0.003) (0.002) 
Gini*Pol. Corr.     -0.300** 
     (0.100) 
R2 0.56 0.49 0.61 0.61 0.64 
N 1,647 604 604 604 604 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 6 - Institutional Factors including time fixed effects (year dummies not displayed) 
Absolute Redistribution (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) 
Lag Gini Market 0.281*** -0.265*** -0.184 0.227*** -0.151* 
 (0.062) (0.059) (0.093) (0.053) (0.061) 
GDP -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Regulation of Part. -0.141 -6.436*** -0.084 -0.057 -5.296** 
 (0.129) (1.568) (0.109) (0.146) (1.565) 
Competitiveness of Part. 0.104 -1.093 0.004 0.075  
 (0.183) (0.984) (0.140) (0.168)  
Political Rights 0.024 -0.043 -2.697* -0.051 -0.350 
 (0.139) (0.087) (1.047) (0.135) (0.503) 
Civil Liberties -0.217 -0.103 -1.229 -0.014  
 (0.209) (0.166) (1.303) (0.164)  
Rule of Law -0.839 -0.420 -0.852 -11.863*** -5.695* 
 (0.465) (0.351) (0.443) (1.995) (2.372) 
Gini*Reg. of Part.  0.135***   0.111** 
  (0.033)   (0.033) 
Gini*Compet. of Part.  0.021    
  (0.022)    
Gini*Pol. Rights   0.055**  0.005 
   (0.020)  (0.010) 
Gini*Civil Liberties   0.024   
   (0.026)   
Gini*Rule of Law    0.236*** 0.111* 
    (0.044) (0.053) 
R2 0.40 0.59 0.48 0.53 0.61 
N 882 882 882 882 882 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 




III. Controlling for lagged Dependent Variable 
Table 7 - Societal Factors including Lag DV 
Absolute Redistribution (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) 
Lag Abs. Redistribution 0.986*** 0.922*** 0.851*** 0.857*** 0.857*** 
 (0.014) (0.039) (0.042) (0.038) (0.042) 
Lag Gini Market -0.014 0.016 -0.114* -0.164** -0.163* 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.045) (0.060) (0.061) 
GDP  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HC  0.038 -3.023** -2.850** -2.851** 
  (0.127) (0.884) (0.825) (0.834) 
Top10  -0.028** -0.051*** -0.138** -0.139** 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.047) (0.045) 
Pol. Corruption  -0.096 0.607 0.357 0.428 
  (0.289) (0.516) (0.483) (1.913) 
Gini*HC   0.062** 0.061*** 0.061*** 
   (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
Gini*Top 10    0.002 0.002* 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Gini*Pol. Corr.     -0.001 
     (0.034) 
R2 0.96 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.90 
N 1,619 600 600 600 600 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 8 - Institutional Factors including Lag DV 
Absolute Redistribution (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) 
Lag Abs. Redistribution 0.944*** 0.880*** 0.911*** 0.909*** 0.879*** 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.019) (0.026) (0.023) 
Lag Gini Market -0.010 -0.195*** -0.182*** -0.006 -0.175*** 
 (0.006) (0.050) (0.043) (0.008) (0.045) 
GDP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Regulation of Part. 0.011 -0.596 0.030 0.018 -1.049** 
 (0.018) (0.452) (0.022) (0.017) (0.390) 
Competitiveness of Part. -0.025 -1.820* -0.062 -0.029  
 (0.031) (0.686) (0.050) (0.030)  
Political Rights 0.022 0.018 -0.866* 0.020 -0.893** 
 (0.025) (0.039) (0.343) (0.028) (0.324) 
Civil Liberties -0.011 0.006 -0.589* 0.000  
 (0.036) (0.045) (0.281) (0.035)  
Rule of Law -0.044 -0.051 -0.074 -1.598** -0.014 
 (0.079) (0.076) (0.081) (0.522) (0.454) 
Gini*Reg. of Part.  0.013   0.022** 
  (0.010)   (0.008) 
Gini*Compet. of Part.  0.038*    
  (0.015)    
Gini*Pol. Rights   0.018*  0.018** 
   (0.007)  (0.007) 
Gini*Civil Liberties   0.013*   
   (0.006)   
Gini*Rule of Law    0.033** -0.001 
    (0.011) (0.010) 
R2 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.95 
N 882 882 882 882 882 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 




I. Proposed Schedule  
04.09.2017 Exposé outlining general idea of thesis sent to J.T. 
- Research question 
- Problem arising and value added 
- Literature overview 
30.09.2017 Data and Methodology 
- Deep dive methodology to be used (*) 
- Data and variables 
- Context specification (*) 
 Approval of Literature Review 
 Approval of Methodology and Data 
15.10.2017 First Data Analysis (*) 
- First data analysis to discuss flaws and preliminary outcomes 
05.11.2017 Start writing: Motivation, Literature and Methodology 
19.11.2017 Start writing: Data and Analysis including results 
30.11.2017 Start writing: Discussion of results and conclusion 
04.12.2017 Upload to Plagiarism Check and send to J.T.   




II. Description of Data Sources and Variables  




Disposable Gini Gini_disp 
Market Gini Gini_mkt 
Absolute Redistribution Abs_Red 
Relative Redistribution Rel_Red 
Disposable Gini st. error gini_disp_se 
Market Gini st. error gini_mkt_se 
Absolute Redistribution st. error absred_se 
Relative Redistribution st. error relred_se 
World Bank 
GDP per capita growth, annual % change GDP_g 
GDP in constant 2010 USD GDP 
Trade as % of GDP Open 
Income Share top 10% Top10 
Income share bottom 10% Bottom10 
Rule of Law, -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values 
reflecting better outcomes  
RoL2 
Penn World Tables 
Investment share Invest 
Human capital index HC 
Freedom House 
Inverse Political Rights, 1 least free 7 most free Pol_Rights 
Inverse Civil Liberties, 1 least free 7 most free Civil_lib 
Polity IV 
Edited Polity IV index Democracy 
Regulation of Participation, 0 unregulated 5 
regulated 
Par_Reg 





Democracy, 1 = Democracy Democ 
Rule of Law, 0 worst 16 best RoL 
Electoral System Type, 1 Maj 2 Prop 3 Mixed ElectSys 
Corruption perceptions index CorrPerc 
Political Corruption PolCorr 
Ethnic Fractionalization EthFra 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization EthnFra 





III. Regressions using the Relative Redistribution measure 
Table 8 - Societal Factors  
Relative 
Redistribution 
     
Lag Gini 
Market 
0.209** 0.245** -0.174 -0.302* -0.209 
 (0.075) (0.077) (0.132) (0.131) (0.136) 
GDP  -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HC  2.029* -6.634* -6.143* -6.135* 
  (0.771) (2.876) (2.940) (2.662) 
Top10  -0.287*** -0.316*** -0.562* -0.651** 
  (0.053) (0.054) (0.259) (0.218) 
Pol. Corruption  2.088 3.810* 3.185* 22.376* 
  (1.523) (1.575) (1.405) (9.166) 
Gini*HC   0.171** 0.167** 0.154** 
   (0.053) (0.051) (0.049) 
Gini*Top 10    0.005 0.007 
    (0.005) (0.004) 
Gini*Pol. Corr.     -0.389* 
     (0.188) 
R2 0.08 0.28 0.35 0.36 0.38 
N 1,647 604 604 604 604 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 




Table 9 - Institutional Factors 
Relative Redistribution      
Lag Gini Market 0.135 -0.582*** -0.454*** 0.081 -0.396** 
 (0.091) (0.158) (0.123) (0.068) (0.138) 
GDP 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Regulation of Part. -0.265 -7.828** -0.196 -0.136 -6.497** 
 (0.206) (2.483) (0.178) (0.237) (2.339) 
Competitiveness of Part. 0.109 -2.182 -0.019 -0.008  
 (0.375) (2.706) (0.289) (0.378)  
Political Rights -0.423 -0.370 -5.127* -0.352 -0.820 
 (0.283) (0.214) (2.330) (0.270) (1.112) 
Civil Liberties 0.177 0.194 0.190 0.260  
 (0.352) (0.298) (2.410) (0.322)  
Rule of Law -1.106 -0.515 -1.116 -14.909*** -6.754 
 (0.816) (0.665) (0.774) (3.028) (3.520) 
Gini*Reg. of Part.  0.162**   0.134** 
  (0.052)   (0.049) 
Gini*Compet. of Part.  0.042    
  (0.056)    
Gini*Pol. Rights   0.096*  0.011 
   (0.046)  (0.021) 
Gini*Civil Liberties   0.003   
   (0.049)   
Gini*Rule of Law    0.297*** 0.130 
    (0.064) (0.078) 
R2 0.08 0.26 0.15 0.21 0.27 
N 882 882 882 882 882 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 




IV. Regression with random effects  
Table 10 - Societal Factors random effects 
Absolute Redistribution      
Lag Gini Market 0.385*** 0.369*** -0.046 -0.121 -0.091 
 (0.049) (0.067) (0.079) (0.075) (0.082) 
GDP  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HC  0.455 -7.761*** -7.517*** -7.524*** 
  (0.446) (1.481) (1.545) (1.510) 
Top10  -0.259*** -0.274*** -0.410** -0.435*** 
  (0.042) (0.039) (0.131) (0.111) 
Pol. Corruption  -2.405 -0.288 -0.508 5.494 
  (1.238) (1.122) (1.042) (4.611) 
Gini*HC   0.164*** 0.163*** 0.159*** 
   (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) 
Gini*Top 10    0.003 0.003 
    (0.003) (0.002) 
Gini*Pol. Corr.     -0.122 
     (0.107) 
N 1,647 604 604 604 604 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 




Table 11 - Institutional Factors random effects 
Absolute Redistribution     
Lag Gini Market -0.291*** -0.236* 0.207*** -0.162* 
 (0.068) (0.101) (0.054) (0.063) 
GDP 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Regulation of Part. -7.853*** -0.032 0.008 -5.990*** 
 (1.624) (0.118) (0.149) (1.791) 
Competitiveness of Part. -0.096 0.050 0.071  
 (1.107) (0.185) (0.187)  
Political Rights -0.187 -2.985** -0.165 0.043 
 (0.114) (1.073) (0.151) (0.485) 
Civil Liberties 0.051 -1.129 0.118  
 (0.159) (1.341) (0.174)  
Rule of Law -0.022 -0.494 -12.737*** -5.769** 
 (0.370) (0.533) (1.710) (2.086) 
Gini*Reg. of Part. 0.166***   0.127*** 
 (0.035)   (0.038) 
Gini*Compet. of Part. -0.001    
 (0.024)    
Gini*Pol. Rights  0.056**  -0.004 
  (0.021)  (0.010) 
Gini*Civil Liberties  0.027   
  (0.027)   
Gini*Rule of Law   0.263*** 0.120* 
   (0.035) (0.047) 
N 882 882 882 882 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
